Las cotizaciones del crudo subieron a casi 100 dólares la semana pasada en Nueva York (98,60 dólares el barril, un récord histórico) antes de replegarse.
Alguien, además de Chavez, soñó una vez con el precio del barril a 100$ .
A veces da miedo saber lo desorientado que ha estado –y en algunos aspectos todavía está- el gobierno de EEUU en la lucha contra el terrorismo Jihadista.
La guerra global contra el terrorismo (GWOT) y la democracia global exportada languidecen, y una lucha mucho más sofisticada se va perfilando; aún así en España les llevamos una recta de ventaja en conocimientos y experiencia.
A pesar que leen con detalle a Rogelio Alonso y a Fernando Reinares, las numerosas referencias a España, a ETA y al 11-M no parecen siempre muy precisas. Y es que nunca un imperio valoró las aportaciones de la periferia en su justa medida. Nosotros tampoco.
Del largo documento “Terrorism: What’s Coming-The Mutating Threat” del Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), destaco, para los que les de pereza o carezcan del tiempo necesario, lo siguiente [el ensayo de Alex P. Schmid sobre "Terrorism and Energy Security:Targeting Oil and Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures" no tiene desperdicio]:
The Organization of Terrorism.
"The U.S. strongly denies that American policies could contribute to terrorism. There is only a hint of recognition that the expansion of a diffuse jihadist movement has occurred since 2003 and that the war in Iraq is incompatible with creating a global environment that is inhospitable to terrorism. The 2006 strategy statement admits only that “The ongoing fight in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.” On the other hand, the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate (at least as far as is publicly known) cited the war as a motivation for diffuse jihadism but also noted that decisive defeat of the Al Qaeda organization in Iraq would likely be a set back for the global movement. In the short run, it is undeniable that the use of military force by the West against Muslims, no matter what their political allegiance or sectarian bent, fuels extremism."
"The organization of terrorism is complex and sometimes contradictory. There is no single uniform model, no one type of terrorist organization, whether past or future. Instead groups are adaptive and flexible. Continued organizational development and thus more surprises can be expected in the future. Different structures of terrorism require different policies. Oversimplification of the threat cannot lead to an effective response.”
Targeting Oil and Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures.
“…oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huger importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil ‘event’….sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power.” Paul Roberts. The End of Oil. (London: Bloomsbury, 2005) p 93.
“Targeting oil interests is lawful economic jihad. Economic jijad in this era is the best method to hurt the infidels.”. Sheik Abd-Al-Aziz bin Rashid al Anzi. “The Religious Rule of Targeting Oil Interests.”http://www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums, February 26, 2006; cit. Michael Scheuer, Stepan Ulph & John C.K. Daly. Saudi Arab Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy. (Washington, D.C.:Jamestown Foundation, May 2006) p 10.
"Table 2: Basic Energy Facts.
– Peak year of new oil discoveries was 1960; it has been downhill ever since.
– Global economy depends on cheap oil for about 40 percent of its energy needs.
– The USA, with less than 5% of the world’s population, uses almost 25% of the world’s total energy; US lifestyle is twice as energy-intensive as that in Europe and Japan, and about ten times the global average.
– From the G-8 states, Russia has 27% of the world gas reserves and 6% of proven oil reserves; the remaining G-7 have only 4% of gas reserves and 9% of the oil.
– World oil demand, now at [more than] 80 million barrels a day, will jump to 140 million by 2035; natural gas will climb by over 120 percent; coal by nearly 60 percent.
– Electricity demand could, by 2020, be 70 percent higher than today.
– Current energy economy (oil wells, pipelines, tankers, refineries, power plants, transmission lines is worth an estimated ten trillion dollars.
– Saudi Arabia possesses some 265 billion barrels of oil in its subsoil - a quarter or more of the world’s proven crude reserves. "
[Sources: Paul Roberts. The End of Oil. The Decline of the Petroleum Economy and the Rise of the New Energy Order. London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005, pp. 7 – 15; The Sunday Times (London), 9 July 2006, p. 26. ]
"Some authors hold that it is Al Qaeda’s strategy is to “bleed America to bankruptcy.” Al Qaeda has threatened to attack critical Western infrastructures, the “hinges” of the world economy, as bin Laden calls them. These obviously include oil. One step to come closer to this goal is to drive up oil prices to what bin Laden termed a “fair price at the present time” - “a minimum of $100 a barrel.”29 Between 2000 and 2005 the oil prices tripled and in July 2006 peaked at more than $78.30 The “minimum of $100 a barrel” which bin Laden had in mind some years ago no longer sounds fantastic. The question is: can the world absorb a price rise of such an extent without plunging into an economic recession which would, in turn, trigger political instability in emerging economies.”
Observations on the Future of Terrorism.
"In Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain what were essentially terrorist groups not all that long ago (the Irish Republican Army and Basque Homeland and Liberty) are recreating themselves as peaceful political parties, intent on using the ballot box rather than the gun to pursue their political objectives. "(pg 44)
Lessons from the Counterinsurgency Era.
“In other words” he wrote, “it is imaginable, although far from likely in the near term, that some future White House may become interested in scrutinizing the counterinsurgency experience which we have been at some pains to recount and analyze in these pages, for lessons on both the pitfalls and the positive courses of action suggested by the successes and failures of the period. For several reasons it is much to be hoped that such does not turn out to be the case, and most especially for the reason that the lessons or our experience are clearly negative. Effective counterinsurgency, avoiding the brutalities of unadorned suppression, and seeking to deal with the genuine issues in a sophisticated manner which does no damage to our moral and democratic principles, is a complex and difficult maneuver for which the United States has shown no talent.” Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance. (New York: The Free Press, 1977) Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward.
“In developing a full-spectrum response, the government must be able and willing to develop state responses beyond the traditional police and intelligence approaches. It must consider applying a range of tools from other bodies and enforcement authorities. They include: the immigration, customs, and other enforcement authorities; the coast guard (or the marine police); the military; the port, airport and other transportation authorities; the private security industry; th e finance and banking sector; the media; the telecommunications sector; community and othe r influential leaders; and religious and educational institutions.”
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