Avispas contra tarántulas: el Honeywell T-Hawk RQ-16.

El Ministerio de Defensa británico ha adquirido un nuevo dron diseñado para reducir al mínimo las bajas en la búsqueda e inspección cercana de artefactos explosivos improvisados, minas terrestres y coches suicidas. El T-Hawk RQ-16 es un pequeño UAV teledirigido autónomo que ofrece la ventaja sobre el UAV tradicional de flotar en estacionario sobre las posibles amenazas permitiendo una observación próxima sin exponer a los soldados a riesgos innecesarios.

Desarrollado por Honeywell como MAV -toma el nombre militar de la avispa llamada halcón tarántula que ataca a estas arañas venenosas en el desierto- este micro vehículo aéreo utiliza una turbina como sustentación lo que le permite tanto flotar a unos pocos centímetros del suelo como navegar hasta un techo de 3200 m sobre el terreno. Pesa apenas 10 kilos y mide 28 cm de diámetro, tiene una velocidad máxima de 80 km/h, y puede ser lanzado fácilmente de una mochila o un vehículo.

El T-Hawk puede volar hasta 40 minutos de forma autónoma y si el operador ve algo sospechoso acercarse y utilizar el zoom para ver desde más cerca. El dispositivo, que cuesta alrededor de 50.000 €, monta visores diurnos y nocturnos que transmiten la información a los soldados usando un ligero receptor-pantalla de mano .

Tras ser probado en Irak en 2007 los marines de EEUU han encargado a través de una declaración urgente de necesidad (UNS) 372 unidades y ya lo están operando en Afganistán con buenos resultados.

No cabe duda que el T-Hawk es un elemento que complementa de manera excepcional otras capacidades de observación y reconocimiento y que por sus características posibilita su uso en circustancias que un UAV tradicional no permite. Interesante desde luego en el ámbito militar de las operaciones, pero también en otros ámbitos de unidades policiales y de inteligencia tanto en terreno urbanizado como en campo abierto.

MRAP, industria y el conflicto de 2018.

Desgraciadamente nuestra ya pertinaz falta de reflejos nos está llevando a dilatar demasiado la llegada de los MRAP RG-31 al teatro de operaciones de Afganistán; ya hace un año y medio desde que el ministro de defensa anunció en el Consejo de Defensa Nacional de octubre de 2007 que pasaban a ser la prioridad número uno de las FAS. Este desproporcionado retraso -incluso para nuestras FAS- nos va a llevar a que a finales de 2009 -con suerte- comencemos a desplegar un vehículo que EEUU (con más medios, reflejos y experiencia) en esas misma fechas comience a sustituir por los "Baby MRAP" (denominados oficialmente MRAP-ATV), mucho más ágiles, menos pesados e igualmente protegidos ante emboscadas, minas, IED,s y EFP,s.

El precio de fabricación y de transporte que EEUU calcula será de 500000$ por vehículo (la mitad de un MRAP grande) y su puesta en teatro les costará (debido a su menor tamaño y peso) alrededor de 135000$ por unidad. También es de justicia advertir que los MRAP grandes transportan el doble de personal y que por tanto los “Baby MRAP” son el equivalente a nuestros Lince LMV de escuadra que aproximadamente están costándonos los mismos 500000$. Espero que aquel ya lejano debate que algunos sostuvieron sobre si nuestros LMV eran o no MRAP quedará ahora definitivamente zanjado.

Además de lo anterior conviene destacar que el blindaje que montarán estos vehículos será el nuevo composite hiperplástico que mejora la protección ante IED,s y EFP,s que ofrecían los tradicionales composite absorbiendo mayor cantidad de energía cinética y que pesa un 37% menos que el blindaje ordinario. BAE denomina a este nuevo blindaje Tensylon (derivado de un polímero de polietileno de peso molecular elevado) y el 3 de marzo de este año ya ha recibido el primer contrato con EEUU para añadir blindaje a algunos vehículos Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) del Army.

Pero ya hay más, otros ya están superando estos resultados y así TenCate anunció el 12 de marzo de 2009 que había hecho pruebas sobre dos vehículos blindados porta-personal con panza en V añadiendo a uno su nuevo material TenCate Armourtex BM y al otro un blindaje cerámico tradicional (STANAG 4569 nivel 4) obteniendo –según anuncia la propia empresa- resultados realmente sorprendentes. Este blindaje parece estar ya en disposición de ser producido y comercializado.

En definitiva la carrera por proteger los vehículos con blindajes enormemente más resistentes y mucho menos pesados se ha acelerado al calor de los concursos MRAP a nivel mundial y las nuevas generaciones serán cada vez más móviles, ágiles y protegidas. Parece que los MRAP –y en general los vehículos rueda protegidos- recorrerán en poco tiempo el mismo camino que los carros de combate recorrieron durante su ya dilatada vida.

Quizás convendría por tanto –acá en España- que industria y FAS comiencen a repensar con seriedad sus venideros programas de renovación de blindados rueda al calor de una seria reflexión sobre el conflicto que nos encontremos en 2018. ¿Será esto posible?

Me temo que no. Nuestra sobredimensionada industria de defensa de plataformas terrestres está acostumbrada a la subvención y al favor político; y nuestras FAS lo están a permanecer estabuladas a la espera del pienso que le echen decisiones alejadas de la operatividad. Otro error a la larga de las indolentes FAS que se seguirán conformando con lo que le digan, del sostenido tejido industrial que tarde o temprano irá a la quiebra ante el fin de las subvenciones y de la gestión política que se sigue empeñando en un clientelismo regional que desangra nuestras arcas.

Y por favor, no crean que lo contrario no es posible. No sólo en los omnipotentes EEUU; la próxima Francia actúa correctamente en estos asuntos desde hace mucho. Eso les ha permitido presentar el Aravis de las fotos fabricado por Nexter (antigua GIAT). Un MRAP de impresionantes prestaciones ya a disposición de los potenciales compradores y por supuesto de sus FAS.

PS: Y harán falta muchos más artilugios en el 2018. En La Harka pueden leer "Munición de precisión láser de 70mm: ¿hay alguna previsión en España?".

El MRAP-ATV: prestaciones y candidatos.

M-ATV DE Oshkosh.

El 8 de diciembre de 2008 el Ejército de los EEUU emitió una propuesta de adquisición para una clase de vehículos MRAP capaz de operar fuera de la carretera y en terrenos difíciles. El nuevo vehículo más ligero denominado MRAP-ATV (M-ATV) está llamado a satisfacer una declaración de necesidad urgente operacional conjunta (JUONS) para cumplir misiones off-road en el teatro de operaciones de Afganistán. Como ya se ha contado en este observatorio, los prototipos ya están en fase de evaluación apenas 3 meses después del inicio del programa. Se pretende comenzar su despilegue antes de diciembre de 2009, menos de un año después de ese 8 de diciembre.

M-ATV de Force Protection.

El objetivo es reducir el peso del vehículo a 17.000 libras (peso máximo alrededor de 25,000 libras/12,5 toneladas) por tanto aproximadamente dos toneladas menos que el más ligero de los MRAP, y más de tres toneladas que los todavía en evaluación JLTV. A diferencia de JLTV, el M-ATV no está diseñado para el helitransporte en helicóptero, pero sí para ser transportable en un los aviones C-130, C-17 y C-5 (Los MRAP no puede ser transportado en la C-130).

M-ATV de Navistar.

En general, el peso y el nivel de protección se enfoca específicamente a Afganistán donde los MRAP tienen ciertas limitaciones de movilidad. La anchura del vehículo debe ser no mayor de 96 pulgadas (2,4 m) o 106 pulgadas (2,70 m) con el kit añadido de proteción conta EFP. Su altura estará limitada a 102 pulgadas (2,59 m) incluido el Kit de protección de la ametralladora superior.

La velocidad máxima en carretera no será menos de 75 mph y acelerará de 0 a 30 mph en 12 segundos con una autonomía de 300 - 400 millas en recorrido combinados. En cuanto a la superación de pendientes deberá subir una pendiente pavimentada del 40% a una velocidad de 10 mph o ascender una del 60% a un mínimo de 2 millas por hora. También deberá permitir superar una inclinación lateral del 40% en una superficie pavimentada a 5 millas por hora.

M-ATV de BAE-GTS.

Además de mejorar la movilidad y la maniobrabilidad fuera de carretera, el M-ATV debe poner en práctica las lecciones aprendidas del uso de los vehículos MRAP en Afganistán e Irak. Por ejemplo, estos vehículos deben ser mucho más silenciosos permitiendo que se pueda operar en su interior sin protección auditiva dutante ocho horas. Otro requisito exigido es que el vehículo sea capaz de vadear obstáculos de agua dulce de hasta 1,5 metros sin preparción alguna. Además otro requisito exigido desde las zonas de operaciones ha sido el tener capacidad de iluminación lateral hasta al menos 100 m para posibiltar la vigilancia durante la noche.

El mantener cierta movilidad después de sufrir algún daño es también una preocupación importante. El vehículo debe ser capaz de viajar por lo menos un kilometro después de sufrir una perforación de 7.62mm en el sistema de aceite o en el sistema de refrigeración del motor asi como en el sistema de almacenamiento de combustible. También deberá equipar neumáticos Run Flat para mantener la capacidad de movimiento de 30 a 50 kilómetros viajando a una velocidad de 30 km/ h después de sufrir impactos en dos de sus ruedas.

M-ATV de BAE en solitario.

Los vehículos además dispondrán de los mejores y más modernos sistemas de combate que incluirán los de navegación integrado (DAGR), comunicaciones (SINCGARS), intercomunicación de la tripulación, el sistema de mando y control de pequeñas unidades(FBCB2), el sistema de conducción todo tiempo (DVE) y dos cámaras traseras de visión.

En cuanto a la protección activa los vehículos montarán inhibidores contra IEDs y cortacables superior. Además los vehículos de limpieza de rutadeberán poder montar sistemas como el Rhino para detonación a distancia los artificios activados por infrarojos y el Sparks para detonación de artificios de presión. Finalmente deberán ser capaces de integrar el sitema Boomerang de detección de francotiradores y una torre de control remoto CROWS II.

Perspectivas: MRAP y vidas.

Noche movidita en la provincia de SALAH AD-DIN para una sección de la Compañía de Zapadores 571 mientras realizaban una misión de limpieza de ruta en Irak. Un IED explotó al paso del sexto de sus vehículos -un MRAP Cougar- y las operaciones de investigación y persecución de los responsables tuvieron a la unidad toada la noche en danza.

Inmediatamente producido el ataque, se solicitó la presencia del Ejército iraquí. Bajo el nuevo SOFA (Acuerdo del estatus de la fuerza) que entró en vigor el 1 de enero, los iraquíes deben liderar este tipo de operaciones. "No podemos ir y tirar puertas como antes" dijo el Spc. Santoro. "Pero el Ejército Iraquí puede, y debemos esperarles". La fuerza de respuesta rápida compuesta por 3 MRAP estadounidenses y soldados iraquíes en Humvees se dirigió a la zona en apoyo de la sección de zapadores estadounidenses.

Afortunadamente no tuvieron que lamentar bajas. En palabras del jefe de la sección, el Teniente Fuller: “If this was something else other than an MRAP – like an unarmored Humvee,” platoon leader Lt. Loren Fuller said later, “it would have blasted it apart.”. ["Si pasa algo parecido en otro vehículo que no sea un MRAP -como un Humvee no blindado- hubiese saltado por los aires"]

En lugar de ello, afirma la noticia, la explosión pinchó el neumático derecho, resquebrajó el exterior del filtro de aire, agrietó el costado del pasajero delantero e incustró metralla en la ventana del mismo lado. Tras dos horas de búsqueda, el convoy lentamente se dirigió a la Base Conjunta Balad. El MRAP atacado no podía moverse a más de 10 mph.

Creo que es muy clarificador en muchos aspectos el artículo. Donde están y tienen su espacio operativo los MRAP y por qué los EEUU siguen comprando Humvees blindados. Su destino -el de los Humvees- son principalmnete acabar de regalo para las fuerzas iraquíes; con los consiguientes beneficios presentes y futuros de venta, mantenimiento y sostenimiento para su productor industrial y para la economía estadounidense en general.

Para el que aún se pregunte por qué el ejército más poderoso del mundo se ha gastado miles de millones de dólares en MRAPs teniendo la flota mecanizada y acorazada más moderna y numerosa, conviene también leer en Armybase: "US Army Using More MRAP to protect troop in Iraq". [El Ejército de EEUU usa más MRAP para proteger las tropas en Irak].

Algunos datos interesantes son desvelados acerca de la supervivencia a bordo de los MRAP que complementan los ya conocidos:

"El aumento de los ataques está poniendo a los MRAP a prueba, y hasta el momento están aprobando con nota. Las estadísticas conocidas por la AP muestran que mientras que los ataques con los mortíferos EFPs han aumentado alrededor de un 40 por ciento en los últimos tres meses, las muertes en esos atentados han disminuido en hasta un 17 por ciento.

Los portavoces atribuyen la mayor parte de este descenso a los MRAP."

El segundo Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejército de EEUU -el Teniente General Stephen Speakes- ha estado en estos días en Irak para evaluar la eficacia de los MRAP y ha declarado:

"Speakes dijo que Teniente General Rick Lynch, comandante de la 3 ª División de Infantería, le dijo que el uso de los MRAPs ha salvado la vida de unos 40 de sus soldados. Las tropas de Lynch controlan una extensa región al sur de Bagdad."

"Por supuesto que somos conscientes de los costes, y conscientes de lo mucho que América ha sacrificado para poner toda esa capacidad en manos de los soldados" dijo Speakes. "Pero cuando se oye un comandante de división decir "gracias ... estimo que has salvado la vida de 40 de mis hombres" te cambia completamente la perspectiva."

Quizás todos aquellos que se atreven a emitir juicios operativos sobre este asunto debieran antes valorar profundamente cuál es su perspectiva. Y la nuestra.

La nueva generación: los M-ATV.

El Caiman de BAE.

Preguntaba Dani en la anterior entrada acerca de esos nuevos vehículos MRAP ligeros y móviles que el Departamento de Defensa de los EEUU tiene previsto adquirir y desplegar antes de fin de 2009 en Afganistán. Su denominación es M-ATV (MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle) y ya hay bastante información en la red. Respecto a los diseños que nadie espere grandes diferencias exteriores, las mejoras no serán obvias a la vista. En general mejora de blindaje y mejor estabilidad. Aquí dejo unos enlaces muy interesantes:

• El anuncio de concurso.
• La descripción del concurso y el calendario de adquisición.
  
• La presentación power point del General Brogan de este anuncio.
• Y una terriblemente interesante sobre el concurso, lecciones aprendidas y requerimientos que se piden a los prototipos.

Las cifras hablan de adquirir como mínimo 2080 y hasta un máximo de 10000. Las principales empresas se han afanando en presentar las propuestas ya que el plazo terminaba el 15 de enero. Es un pastel de 3 billones de dólares demasiado goloso para dejarlo pasar. Force Protection ha presentado un Cheetah mejorado, BAE un Caiman mejorado y Navistar el MaxxPro Dash. General Dynamics coopera con Force Protection en el Cheetah y parece que presenta sola una oferta a través de GDLS Canadian Division (un RG-31 mk-5 mejorado). Por último Oshkosh ha presentado una oferta basado en el chasis del Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR). Los prototipos deben estar disponibles el 23 de febrero para las primeras pruebas. Las fechas de despliegue esperadas son finales de 2009 ya que se planea empezar a producir en junio de 2009 y se exige un ritmo mínimo de 100 unidades al mes.

Para finales de 2009 ¿A la vez que nuestros RG-31? Sí, a la vez que nuestros RG-31. Gracias a nuestra terrible y legendaria agilidad deplegaremos los vehículos que EEUU intenta reemplazar cuando ellos en teoría ya hayan desarrollado, elegido y desplegado otro algo mejor para sustituirle.

A lo mejor es el momento de plantearse qué vehículo comprar en la segunda fase de la cacareada "renovación de vehículos". ¿Sabrá algo de esto nuestra DGAM? ¿Le interesará? ¿Está nuestra industria tomando nota?

Me temo que no. Ni sabemos ni nos importa. Nosotros seguimos comprando a Santana Motor vehículos inservibles e inoperantes a dos cientos de miles de euros la unidad. A precio de Ferrari F-430 nos salen. ¿Será un error o simplemente una subvención descarada?

IEDs y otras trampas mortales.

Según afirma USA Today '94 military report panned Humvee as 'deathtrap' ["Un informe militar de 1994 calificaba el Humvee como una trampa mortal"]:

"Army and Marine Corps officials knew nearly a decade before the invasion of Iraq that its workhorse Humvee vehicle, was a "deathtrap" even with armor added to protect it against roadside bombs, according to an inspector general's report.
Reports distributed throughout the Army and Marine Corps after the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the Somalia conflict in 1994 urged the development of armored vehicles to avoid the devastating effects of roadside bombs and land mines, but the Pentagon failed to act, the report says.

The report distributed throughout the Army and Marine Corps in 1994 found that Humvees "even with a mine-protection retrofit kit developed for Somalia remained a deathtrap in the event of an anti-tank mine detonation."

[El Ejército y Cuerpo de Marines de los EEUU sabían casi una década antes de la invasión de Iraq que su vehículo de batalla Humvee era una trampa mortal incluso con blindaje añadido para protegerlo contra las bombas de carretera, según un informe del inspector general.

Los informes distribuidos en todo el Ejército y el Cuerpo de Marines después de la Guerra del Golfo Pérsico de 1991 y el conflicto de Somalia en 1994 instó al desarrollo de vehículos blindados que evitasen los efectos devastadores de las bombas de carretera y las minas terrestres, pero el Pentágono no actuó, según el informe.

El informe que se distribuyó en todo el Ejército y la Infantería de Marina en 1994 constató que los Humvees "incluso con un kit adaptado contra minas desarrollado para Somalia seguía siendo un trampa mortal en el caso de una detonación de minas contracarro".]

También según USA Today, "Pentagon plans to field new lighter armored vehicles". [El Pentágono planea desplegar nuevos vehículos blindados más ligeros."]:

"The Pentagon plans to field an all-terrain armored vehicle later this year to provide off-road maneuverability and enough armor to deflect the growing threat of roadside bombs in Afghanistan.
Such a vehicle will combine the maneuverability of the Humvee, the military's workhorse vehicle, with the protection of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) troop carrier, Pentagon documents show.

The Pentagon could buy up to 10,000 of the new trucks, which the military will need as it plans to almost double the number of servicemembers in Afghanistan to 60,000 over the next few years. So far, the Pentagon says it will buy at least 2,080 of the new MRAPs.

There were a record 3,276 attacks from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2008. Those attacks killed 161 coalition servicemembers and wounded 722.

Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Michael Brogan, who heads the Pentagon's MRAP program, will testify before the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday about troops' vehicle needs in the field."

El General Brogan del USMC , jefe del programa MRAP.

"El Pentágono tiene previsto desplegar un nuevo vehículo blindado todo terreno a finales de este año que ofrezca maniobrabilidad fuera de carretera y suficiente blindaje para desviar la creciente amenaza de las bombas de carretera en Afganistán. Este vehículo combinará la maniobrabilidad de los Humvee, el vehículo de batalla militar, con la protección de los MRAP según el Pentágono.

El Pentágono podría comprar hasta 10.000 de los nuevos vehículos, los cuales se necesitarán para los planes de casi duplicar el número de tropas en Afganistán en los próximos años hasta 60000. Hasta ahora, el Pentágono dice que comprará por lo menos 2080 de los nuevos MRAPs.

En 2008 hubo 3.276 ataques con artefactos explosivos improvisados (IED) . Esos ataques mataron a 161 e hirieron a 722 soldados de la coalición.

El General de Brigada (USMC) Brogan (jefe del programa MRAP) ha testificado el 04 de febrero ante el Comité de las FAS sobre las necesidades de vehículos de las tropas sobre el terreno. "

Histórico de ataques con IED en Afganistán. Hasta 2007 no se decidió la adquisición de MRAP.

Suponemos que el Gen Brogan habrá dejado constancia de algunos datos comprobados como ya hizo su jefe, el Secretario de Defensa Gates, cuando compereció ante este comité del Senado el pasado 27 de enero afirmando:

"The casualty rate from an attack on an MRAP is less than one-third that of Humvees, and less than half that of an Abrams tank."

"La tasa de bajas que se producen en un ataque a un MRAP es 1/3 de la de un ataque a un Humvee, y menos de la mitad de la de un ataque a un tanque Abrams."

Sin más comentarios.

La hoja de ruta de Gates ante el Senado de los EEUU.

Conviene no perderse ni un punto ni una coma de la declaración de intenciones del Secretario de Defensa Gates ante el Comité de las Fuerzas Armadas del Senado de los EEUU. Lo siento por el inglés (La negrita es mía).

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of challenges facing the Department of Defense and some of my priorities for the coming year. In doing so, I am mindful that the new administration has only been in place for a few days and new or changing policies will likely arise in coming months. Later this spring, I will present President Obama’s defense budget, and, at that time, will be better equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the Department.

On a personal note, I want to thank many of you for your very kind farewell remarks at my last hearing. I assure you that you are no more surprised to see me back than I am. In the months ahead, I may need to re-read some of those kind comments to remind myself of the warm atmosphere up here as I was departing. Seriously, I am humbled by President Obama’s faith in me, and deeply honored to continue leading the United States military. I thank the committee for your confidence in my leadership and your enduring, steadfast support of the military.

I’d like to start by discussing our current operations before moving on to my ongoing institutional initiatives.

Afghanistan and Pakistan
There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan. As you know, the United States has focused more on Central Asia in recent months. President Obama has made it clear that the Afghanistan theater should be our top overseas military priority. The ideology we face was incubated there when Afghanistan became a failed state, and the extremists have largely returned their attention to that region in the wake of their reversals in Iraq. As we have seen from attacks across the globe – on 9/11 and afterwards – the danger reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan or Pakistan.

There are more than forty nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and more, involved in Afghanistan – all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption, a ruthless and resilient insurgency, and violent extremists of many stripes, not the least of which is Al Qaeda. Coordination of these international efforts has been less than stellar, and too often the whole of these activities has added up to less than the sum of the parts – a concern I’m sure many of you share.

Based on our past experience in Afghanistan – and applicable lessons from Iraq – there are assessments underway that should provide an integrated way forward to achieve our goals.

As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. But it is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas – a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban. That is why the U.S. is considering an increase in our military presence, in conjunction with a dramatic increase in the size of the Afghan security forces. Because of the multi-faceted nature of the fight – and because of persistent ISAF shortfalls for training teams – all combat forces, whether international or American, will have a high level of counterinsurgency training, which was not always the case.

In the coming year, I also expect to see more coherence as efforts to improve civil-military coordination gain traction – allowing us to coordinate Provincial Reconstruction Teams in a more holistic fashion, both locally and regionally. And there will be an increased focus on efforts at the district level, where the impact of both our military and rebuilding efforts will be felt more concretely by the Afghan people, who will ultimately be responsible for the future of their nation.

While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can attain what I believe should be among our strategic objectives: an Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda, reject the rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they elected and in which they have a stake.

Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the porous border between them. I do believe that the Pakistani government is aware of the existential nature of the threat emanating from the FATA. The U.S. military knows firsthand how difficult it is to wage counterinsurgency with a force designed for large-scale, mechanized warfare – a fact complicated by Pakistan’s recent tensions with India. Pakistan is a friend and partner, and it is necessary for us to stay engaged – and help wherever we can. I can assure you that I am watching Pakistan closely, and that we are working with State, Treasury, and all parts of the government to fashion a comprehensive approach to the challenges there.

Iraq after SOFA
As you know, the Status of Forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraq went into effect on January 1st. The agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June, and all troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011, at the latest. It balances the interests of both countries as we see the emergence of a sovereign Iraq in full control of its territory. Provincial elections in just a few days are another sign of progress.

The SOFA marks an important step forward in the orderly drawdown of the American presence. It is a watershed – a firm indication that American military involvement is winding down. Even so, I would offer a few words of caution. Though violence has remained low, there is still the potential for setbacks – and there may be hard days ahead for our troops.

As our military presence decreases over time, we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come – assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our partnership. The stability of Iraq remains critical to the future of the Middle East, a region that multiple presidents of both political parties have considered vital to the national security of the United States.

North Korea, Iran, and Proliferation
Beyond these operations, one of the greatest dangers we continue to face is the toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. North Korea and Iran present uniquely vexing challenges in this regard. North Korea has produced enough plutonium for several atomic bombs; Iran is developing the capabilities needed to support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s conventional capability continues to degrade as it becomes more antiquated and starved – in some cases literally – for resources and support. Both countries have ballistic missile programs of increasing range and a record of proliferation.

The regional and nuclear ambitions of Iran continue to pose enormous challenges to the U.S. Yet I believe there are non-military ways to blunt Iran’s power to threaten its neighbors and sow instability throughout the Middle East. The lower price of oil deprives Iran of revenues and, in turn, makes U.N. economic sanctions bite harder. In addition, there is the growing self-sufficiency and sovereignty of Iraq, whose leaders – including Iraqi Shia – have shown they do not intend for the new, post-Saddam Iraq to become a satrapy of its neighbor to the east. This situation provides new opportunities for diplomatic and economic pressure to be more effective than in the past.

On North Korea, the Six-Party Talks have been critical in producing some forward momentum – especially with respect to North Korea’s plutonium production – although I don’t think anyone can claim to be completely satisfied with the results so far. These talks do offer a way to curtail and hopefully eliminate its capacity to produce more plutonium or to enrich uranium, and reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Our goal remains denuclearization, but it is still to be seen whether North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear ambitions entirely.

Russia and China
Even as the Department of Defense improves America’s ability to meet unconventional threats, the United States must still contend with the challenges posed by the military forces of other countries – from the actively hostile, to rising powers at strategic crossroads. The security challenges faced by other nation-states is real, but significantly different than during the last century.

The Russian invasion of Georgia last year was a reminder that the Russian military is a force to be reckoned with in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. We should not, however, confuse Russia’s attempt to dominate its “near abroad” with an ideologically driven campaign to dominate the globe – as was the case during the Cold War. The country’s conventional military, although much improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. Saddled with demographic and budget pressures, the Russians have concentrated on improving their strategic and nuclear forces, but recently have begun to devote more attention to their conventional capabilities.

As we know, China is modernizing across the whole of its armed forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber-and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernization in these areas could threaten America’s primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them.

We have seen some improvement in the U.S.-Chinese security relationship recently. Last year, I inaugurated a direct telephone link with the Chinese defense ministry. Military to military exchanges continue, and we have begun a strategic dialogue to help us understand each other’s intentions and avoid potentially dangerous miscalculations.

As I’ve said before, the U.S. military must be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum – including the armed forces of other nations. On account of Iraq and Afghanistan, we would be hard pressed at this time to launch another major ground operation. But elsewhere in the world, the United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any adversary that committed an act of aggression – whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Taiwan Strait. The risk from these types of scenarios cannot be ignored, but it is a manageable one in the short- to mid-term.

Wounded Warrior Care
Apart from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, my highest priority as Secretary of Defense is improving the outpatient care and transition experience for troops that have been wounded in combat.

Since February of 2007, when we learned about the substandard out-patient facilities at Walter Reed, the Department has implemented a number of measures to improve health care for our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. We have acted on some 530 recommendations put forth by several major commissions and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. Notable progress includes:

· Working closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs to better share electronic health data and track patients’ long-term recovery process;
· Dedicating new facilities, with the help of private partners, such as the national intrepid centers in Bethesda, Maryland, and San Antonio, Texas; and
· Improving overall case management through programs such as the Army’s “Warrior Transition Units” that shepherd injured soldiers back to their units or help them transition to veteran status.

More than 3,200 permanent cadre are now dedicated to soldiers assigned to warrior transition units, and they have cared for more than 21,000 men and women thus far. I have personally visited these units at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Post-traumatic stress, traumatic brain injury, and associated ailments are, and will continue to be, the signature military medical challenge facing the Department for years to come. We have made some strides to reduce the stigma associated with the scars of war, both seen and unseen. For instance, last February, the Army Inspector General identified a disturbing trend: Troops were hesitant to get help for mental health because they were worried about the impact on their security clearance, and perhaps their career. To resolve this problem, we worked with our interagency partners to change “Question 21” on the government security clearance application so that, as a general matter, it excludes counseling related to service in combat, including post-traumatic stress. Put simply, mental health treatment, in and of itself, will not be a reason to revoke or deny a security clearance.

We have invested more than $300 million in research for Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. The Department created a comprehensive TBI registry and thus now has a single point of responsibility to track incidents and recovery. In the last year, we’ve added more than 220 new mental-health providers to treatment facilities across the country.

The Services are doing more to address mental health needs. The Marine Corps is, for instance, embedding Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) teams in front-line units to better channel medical attention to those who need help quickly. All the services have 24-hour “hot lines” available to troops. Health-care providers are being trained to better identify the first signs of psychological trauma.

We are addressing PTSD and related injuries on a number of fronts and have made much progress. But not every servicemember returning from Iraq and Afghanistan is getting the treatment he or she needs. I believe we have yet to muster and coordinate the various legal, policy, medical, and budget resources across the Department to address these types of injuries.
Considerable work remains as we institutionalize what has been successful and recalibrate what still falls short. The Disability Evaluation System is a useful example. In November of 2007, a pilot program was launched to streamline the Disability Evaluation System (DES) by providing a VA rating to be used by both DoD and VA. Approximately 900 servicemembers are currently enrolled in the pilot program, and it has enabled us to reduce the time required to determine their disability rating and, more importantly, to alleviate some frustration caused by a needlessly complex process.

Overall, I remain concerned that our wounded warriors are still subjected to a system that is designed to serve the general military beneficiary population – the overwhelming majority of whom have not been injured in combat. Earlier this month, we implemented a policy that allows the secretaries of the services to expedite troops through the DES who have combat-related illnesses or injuries that are catastrophic. Nonetheless, we must give serious consideration to how we can better address the unique circumstances facing our servicemembers with combat-related ailments.

As long as I am secretary of defense, I will continue to work to improve treatment and care for every single wounded warrior.

Ground Force Expansion and Stress on the Force
In an effort to meet our nation’s commitments and relieve stress on our force and their troops’ families, the Department continues to expand the end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps – growth that began in 2007 and will continue for several years.

The Army exceeded both recruiting and retention goals for FY 2008, and is on path to achieve its goal of an active duty end-strength of 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. It will continue to increase the number of active Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with a goal of moving from 40 to 42 BCTs this year and towards an end goal of 48 BCTs.

Despite having fallen 5 percent short of its retention goal, the Marine Corps is on track to meet its end-strength goal of 202,000 by the end of this fiscal year.

In all, the Army and Marine Corps are undergoing the largest increase to their active ranks in some four decades. The expectation is that, with a larger total force, individual troops and units will, over time, deploy less frequently with longer dwell times at home. The goal for the Army is two years off for every year of deployment. The expected reduction of American troops in Iraq could be offset by proposed increases in Afghanistan, so it may take some time before we reach that goal. The Services are carefully managing their growth to ensure that it is consistent with the high standards expected from an all-volunteer force.

National Guard
As a result of the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the National Guard in America’s defense has transformed from being a strategic reserve to being part of the pool of forces available for deployments.

In view of the National Guard’s growing operations and homeland security responsibilities, and to elevate the Guard in deliberations over policy and budget, I am pleased to say that the chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a full general. Another senior Guard officer recently became Northcom’s deputy commander, also a historic first that I hope will pave the way for a Guard officer to one day head that command.

One of the challenges we face is to see that, to the extent possible, the Guard’s critical domestic responsibilities do not suffer as a result of its operational missions. The demand for Guard support of civil authorities here at home remains high: For example, the “man-days” that Guardsmen have spent fighting fires, performing rescue and recovery, and other duties increased by almost 60 percent in 2008 as compared to 2007.

With the support of the Congress, the Department has substantially increased support for America’s reserve component – the Guard and Reserves – which for decades had been considered a low priority for equipment, training, and readiness. Today, the standard is that the Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the active force. For FY 2009, the base budget request included $6.9 billion to continue to replace and repair the National Guard’s equipment.

The panel created by Congress four years ago, the Punaro commission, has been a useful spur to the Department’s efforts to ensure that both reserve components are better trained, manned, and equipped for this new era. We have taken, or are taking, action on more than 80 percent of the commission’s recommendations.

For example, the panel suggested a combined pay and personnel system to fix problems stemming from the shift from the reserve pay system to the active duty pay system. The Department is now launching that integrated system.

Since taking this post I have tried to ease, to the extent possible, the stress on our reserve components by implementing mobilization policies that are more predictable and conducive to unit cohesion. We have provided greater predictability as to when a Guard member will be deployed by establishing a minimum standard of 90 days advance notice prior to mobilization. In practice, on average, the notification time is about 270 days.

There is no longer a 24-month lifetime limit on deployment, but each mobilization of National Guard and Reserve troops is now capped at 12 months. The goal is five years of dwell time for one year deployed. We have made progress towards this goal but are not there yet. For example, the ratio of dwell time to mobilization for the Army National Guard this fiscal year is just over 3 to 1.

Reliance upon the reserve component for overseas deployment has declined over time. For example, the percentage of Army soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan who are Guardsmen or Reservists is about half what it was in summer 2005.

Nuclear Stewardship
I continue to believe that as long as other nations have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must maintain an arsenal of some level. The stewardship of that arsenal is perhaps the military’s most sensitive mission – with no margin for error.

That there should be any question in that regard is why recent lapses in the handling of nuclear weapons and material were so grave. They were evidence of an erosion in training, expertise, resources, and accountability in this critical mission. And they brought severe consequences, starting at the unit level and reaching up to the top leadership of the Air Force.

Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of the past, I do believe the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable. The Air Force has taken significant steps to improve its nuclear stewardship by:

· Streamlining the inspection process for nuclear material to ensure that it is all handled properly;
· Standing up a new headquarters office – Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration – that concentrates on policy oversight and staff integration for nuclear programs. The office’s leader reports directly to the Air Force chief of staff;
· Creating a Global Strike Command, which has brought all of the Air Force’s nuclear-capable bombers and ICBMs under one entity; and
· Reassigning the supply chain for nuclear programs to the complete control of the Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, which is being overhauled and expanded.

A task force headed by former Energy and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has now reported. It has identified many trends, both recent and long-term, that may warrant corrective action. Among its recommendations:

· A new assistant secretary of defense for deterrence to oversee nuclear management; and
· Develop and maintain a strategic roadmap to modernize and sustain our nuclear forces.
I will be evaluating all of the Schlesinger Commission recommendations along with the new service secretaries and defense team.

Defending Space and Cyberspace
The full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities on land, sea, and air now depend on digital communications and the satellites and data networks that support them. Our communications, navigation, weather, missile warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems rely on unfettered access to space. At the same time, more nations – about 60 in all – are active in space, and there are more than 800 satellites in orbit. The importance of space defense was highlighted during my first year in this job when the Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite weapon.

In an effort to maintain our technological edge and protect access to this critical domain, we will continue to invest in joint space-based capabilities such as infrared systems and global positioning systems. Air Force Space Command has nearly 40,000 personnel dedicated to monitoring space assets and is training professionals in this career field.

With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and potential adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to DoD’s vast information grid – a system that encompasses more than 15,000 local, regional, and wide-area networks, and approximately 7 million IT devices. DoD systems are constantly scanned and probed by outside entities, but we have developed a robust network defense strategy. We will continue to defend our systems against network attacks, intrusions, and other incidents.

It is noteworthy that Russia’s relatively crude ground offensive into Georgia was preceded by a sophisticated cyber attack. The massive cyber attack suffered by Estonia in 2007, which I discussed with our partners during a recent visit there, illustrates how quickly malicious hackers can bring even a technologically-sophisticated government to a standstill. To learn from this experience and share technological know-how, the U.S. government is co-sponsoring the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

Wartime Procurement
When we are at war, I believe the overriding priority of the Defense Department and military services should be to do everything possible to provide troops in the field everything they need to be successful. To place our defense bureaucracies on a war footing with a wartime sense of urgency, I have accelerated procurement of a number of capabilities, notably:

· Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – specifically, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs); and
· Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles – or MRAPs.

UASs have become one of the most critical capabilities in our military. They give troops the tremendous advantage of seeing full-motion, real-time, streaming video over a target – such as an insurgent planting an IED. Last April, I launched a Department-wide taskforce to speed additional UASs to theater and to ensure we were getting maximum use out of the assets already there. Since then, the Air Force has:
· Increased Predator air patrols by nearly 30 percent;
· Opened a second school to train personnel on UASs;
· Created a career track for UASs; and
· For the first time, allowed non-rated officers to operate UASs.

We’ve also seen how relatively low cost, off-the-shelf technology can have a huge impact on the battlefield. The Army’s Task Force Odin resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of full-motion video available to commanders in Iraq. We are in the process of trying to replicate those successes in Afghanistan. As part of the effort to increase ISR, we are fielding more than 50 turboprop aircraft outfitted with sensors.

In Iraq, the majority of our combat deaths and injuries have been a result of road-side bombs, IEDs, and explosively formed penetrators. The casualty rate from an attack on an MRAP is less than one-third that of Humvees, and less than half that of an Abrams tank. In May 2007, I directed the Department to make MRAPs our top acquisition priority, and, with extraordinary help from the Congress, the Department has sent more than 12,000 MRAPs to theater. The Army is currently developing a lighter version of the MRAP better suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan.

The MRAP and ISR experiences raise a broader concern about wartime acquisition. In the past, modernization programs have sought a 99 percent solution over a period of years, rather than a 75 percent solution over a period of weeks or months. Rather than forming ad hoc groups to field capabilities like UASs and MRAPs, we must figure out how to institutionalize procurement of urgently-needed resources in wartime.

One option is to continue to spin out components of large-scale, long-term modernization projects in real time for early field testing and use in ongoing operations, then fold the results into longer-term product development. We are doing so in Afghanistan and Iraq with Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, a component the Army’s Future Combat Systems used to clear caves, search bunkers, or cross minefields. Such field testing ensures that a program like FCS – whose total cost could exceed $200 billion if completely built out – will continue to demonstrate its value for both conventional and unconventional scenarios.

Defense Acquisition
As I focused on the wars these past two years, I ended up punting a number of procurement decisions that I believed would be more appropriately handled by my successor and a new administration. Well, as luck would have it, I am now the receiver of those punts – and in this game there are no fair catches.

Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is acquisitions – broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services and manage the taxpayers’ money. The Congress, and this committee in particular, have rightly been focused on this issue for some time. The economic crisis makes the problem even more acute. Allow me to share a few general thoughts.

There are a host of issues that have led us to where we are, starting with long-standing systemic problems:
· Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are particularly pronounced in the area of acquisition: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability, and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense and between DoD and other parts of the government.
· At the same time, acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress – making any sort of long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base costs next to impossible.
· Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years, for example, the Department of Defense has operated with an average percentage of vacancies in the key acquisition positions ranging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.

Thus the situation we face today, where a small set of expensive weapons programs has had repeated – and unacceptable – problems with requirements, schedule, cost, and performance.
While the number of overturned procurements as a result of protests remains low in absolute numbers – 13 out of more than three and a half million contract actions in FY 2008 – highly publicized issues persist in a few of the largest programs. The same is true of cost over-runs, where five programs account for more than half of total cost growth. The list of big-ticket weapons systems that have experienced contract or program performance problems spans the services: the Air Force tanker, CSAR-X, VH-71, Osprey, Future Combat Systems, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Littoral Combat Ship, Joint Strike Fighter, and so on.

Since the end of World War II, there have been nearly 130 studies on these problems – to little avail. I mention all this because I do not believe there is a silver bullet, and I do not think the system can be reformed in a short period of time – especially since the kinds of problems we face date all the way back to our first Secretary of War, whose navy took three times longer to build than was originally planned at more than double the cost.

That said, I do believe we can make headway, and I have already begun addressing these issues:
· First, I believe that the FY 2010 budget must make hard choices. Any necessary changes should avoid across-the-board adjustments, which inefficiently extend all programs.
· We have begun to purchase systems at more efficient rates for the production lines. I believe we can combine budget stability and order rates that take advantage of economies of scale to lower costs.
· I will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the “75 percent” solution instead of smaller quantities of “99 percent,” exquisite systems.
· While the military’s operations have become very joint – and impressively so – budget and procurement decisions remain overwhelmingly service-centric. To address a given risk, we may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one service and less in that of another service – particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.
· We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior.
· I feel that many programs that cost more than anticipated are built on an inadequate initial foundation. I believe the Department should seek increased competition, use of prototypes, and ensure technology maturity so that our programs are ready for the next phases of development.
· Finally, we must restore the Department’s acquisition team. I look forward to working with the Congress to establish a necessary consensus on the need to have adequate personnel capacity in all elements of the acquisition process. On that note, I thank you for continuing to give us the funding, authorities, and support to sustain our growth plan for the defense acquisition workforce.

Conclusion
As we look ahead to the important work that we have in front of us, I would leave you with the following thoughts.

I have spent the better part of the last two years focused on the wars we are fighting today, and making sure that the Pentagon is doing everything possible to ensure that America’s fighting men and women are supported in battle and properly cared for when they return home.

Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view, revealed underlying flaws in the institutional priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America’s defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future wars, to prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war. The challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize the irregular capabilities gained and means to support troops in theater that have been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.

This requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment supports current operations and the way it prepares for future conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries, and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.

The choices we make will manifest themselves in how we train, whom we promote, and, of course, how we spend. As I mentioned, President Obama will present his budget later this spring. One thing we have known for many months is that the spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department.

But for all the difficulties we face, I believe this moment also presents an opportunity – one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity. To critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.

As I’ve said before, we will not be able to “do everything, buy everything.” And, while we have all spoken at length about these issues, I believe now is the time to take action. I promise you that as long as I remain in this post I will focus on creating a unified defense strategy that determines our budget priorities. This is, after all, about more than just dollars: It goes to the heart of our national security.

I will need help from the other stakeholders – from industry, and from you, the members of Congress. It is one thing to speak broadly about the need for budget discipline and acquisition reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about specific weapons systems and defense priorities based solely on national interests. And then to stick to those decisions over time. The President and I need your help as all of us together do what is best for America as a whole in making those decisions.

I have no illusions that all of this will be solved while I am at the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful on the institutional side, the benefits of these changes may not be visible for years. My hope, however, is to draw a line and make systemic progress – to put the Department on a glide path for future success.

I look forward to working with each of you to gain your insight and recommendations along the way. Once more, I thank you for all you’ve done to support the Department of Defense and the men and women wearing our nation’s uniform.

I look forward to your questions.

Hechos, enmiendas y conclusiones.

El 20 de abril de 1995 el jefe de la oposición, el Sr. Aznar, salió ileso de un ataque con un coche bomba cargado con 25 kilos de explosivo. Aquel vehículo, como ya hacen otros vehículos que entran y salen todos los días de ministerios y cancillerías próximas, aguantó un impacto a menos de 2 metros sin que los ocupantes sufriesen ningún daño gracias a la cápsula de seguridad que protegía a los ocupantes.

En julio de 2007 este MRAP Cougar sufrió un ataque con un coche bomba cargado de 70 kilos de explosivos en Irak. No hubo bajas, sólo herido leves. La burbuja de la cámara de la cámara de personal quedó intacta.

El 18 de octubre de 2008 un Lince italiano fue atacado mediante un coche bomba en Herat con resultado de 6 heridos leves. En el video insertado se ve como ha volado y volcado al lado de la carretera, la cámara de personal quedo intacta.

En julio de 2007 seis paracaidistas españoles: Jeyson Alejandro Castaño, Jonathan Galea, Manuel David Portas, Yhon Edisson Posada, Jefferson Vargas y Juan Carlos Víllora murieron al explotar un coche bomba al paso de su BMR por la aldea de Sahel al Derdara (El Líbano). El BMR quedó destrozado, principalmente la cámara de personal que fue barrida en sentido longitudinal.

El 9 de noviembre de 2008 el brigada Juan Andrés Suárez García y el cabo primero Rubén Alonso Ríos perdieron su vida en un ataque contra su BMR que cruzaba la zona de Shindand en Afganistán con un coche bomba cargado con 35 kilos de explosivo a seis metros de distancia.

En mayo de 2007 el Senador Biden, ahora vicepresidente electo de los EEUU, ante el Senado de los EEUU:

"Fast Facts about MRAPs:

– MRAPS can hold four to twelve people provide 4 to 5 times more protection than an up-armored humvee.

– MRAPS have raised steel V-shaped hulls and chasses. The raised hull gives the blast more time to expand, lessening its impact on those inside the vehicle. The V-shape also pushes the blast up the sides of the vehicle, away from the occupants.

– With a humvee, the flat bottom sends the blast through the floor and right into the occupants.

– MRAPS have side armor and bulletproof glass, as well as tires that can be driven when flat.

– MRAPS are proven to reduce casualties from road-side bombs (the most lethal weapon used against our troops in Iraq) by sixty-seven to eighty percent. "

[Hechos sobre los MRAP:

- MRAPS proporcionan 4 o 5 veces más protección que un humvee protegido

– Los MRAPS tienen panzas sobre elevadas en forma de V. La elevación de la panza proporciona más tiempo hasta que la explosión le alcanza y la forma en V reflecta la explosión acalla el exterior del habitáculo de los ocupantes.

- Con un humvee de panza plana, la explosión va directa a los ocupantes.

– Los MRAPs tienen blindaje lateral y cristales blindados, así como neumáticos que pueden ser utilizados incluso cuando pierden la presión.

_ Está probado que los MRAPS reducen las bajas de los artefactos improvisados al borde de las carreteras entre un 67% a un 80%.]

Este Cougar pisó una mina en Irak en 2007, los ocupantes resultaron ilesos. Abajo el BMR donde murió la soldado Rodríguez al pisar una mina en Shindad (Afganistán).

Entrevista al Secretario de Defensa de los EEUU, Robert Gates, el 10 de mayo de 2007:

“Gates told reporters during yesterday’s Pentagon news conference that he’s impressed by what he’s read about the MRAPs and the improved troop protection they offer over up-armored Humvees. He cited an article that noted that no Marines had been killed during 300 incidents in which their MRAPs were involved in improvised-explosive-device attacks. “That certainly got my attention,” he said.”

[Gates dijo a los periodistas durante la rueda de prensa del Pentágono que estaba impresionado por lo que había leído sobre los MRAP y la mejora en la protección de la fuerza que ofrecían sobre los Hummer blindados. Citó un artículo que relataba que ni un solo marine había muerto durante los 300 ataques con dispositivos explosivos improvisados en los que los MRAP se habían visto envueltos . “Eso llamó definitivamente mi atención” dijo.] .

"Sixty-five MRAPs in use in Iraq are saving Marines’ lives, Lt. Gen. Emerson Garner, the Marine Corps’ deputy commandant for programs and resources, told a congressional committee earlier this year. “Our experience is that Marines in these vehicles have been four or five times safer than a Marine in an armored Humvee,” Garner told members of the House and Senate Sea Power and Expeditionary Forces subcommittees."

[65 MRAPs de servicio en Irak están salvando la vida de los marines, dijo el Teniente General Emerson Garner, segundo jefe del Cuerpo de Marines para recursos y programas, a un comité del congreso a principios de año. “Nuestra experiencia indica que los marines en estos vehículos están 4 o 5 veces más seguros que en los Hummer blindados”].

Este LMV italiano pisó una mina de 6 kilos en Afganistán en 2008. Sin heridos. La cámara de personal resultó intacta.

El 16 de septiembre de 2007, el Teniente General Wesley Clark apuntaba lecciones para la próxima guerra :

"One of the most important lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- and Vietnam, for that matter -- is that we need to safeguard our troops. The U.S. public is more likely to sour on a conflict when it sees the military losing blood, not treasure. So to keep up our staying power, our skill in hunting and killing our foes has to be matched by our care in concealing and protecting our troops. Three particularly obvious requirements are body armor, mine-resistant vehicles, and telescopic and night sights for every weapon. But these things are expensive for a military that has historically been enamored of big-ticket items such as fighter planes, ships and missiles. Many of us career officers understood these requirements after Vietnam, but we couldn't shift the Pentagon's priorities enough to save the lives of forces sent to Iraq years later."

"Una de las más importantes lecciones de las guerras en Irak y Afganistán - y Vietnam, para el caso - es que tenemos que proteger nuestras tropas. Es más probable que la opinión pública estadounidense se enfade cuando ve a sus militares perder sangre más que cuando pierden dinero. Así que para mantener nuestra resistencia y nuestra capacidad letal esta ha de ir acompañada de nuestra preocupación en ocultar y proteger a nuestras tropas. Tres requisitos particularmente evidentes son los chalecos antibalas, los MRAPs y los visores nocturnos para cada arma. Pero estas cosas son caras para unos militares que históricamente se han enamorado de los grandes programas tales como aviones de combate, buques y misiles. Muchos de nosotros, oficiales de carrera entendió estos requisitos después de Vietnam, pero no pudimos impulsar el cambio de las prioridades del Pentágono lo suficiente para salvar las vidas de las fuerzas enviadas a Irak años más tarde”.

El 25 de septiembre de 2007 nuestro Ministro de Defensa defendía los BMR en el Congreso de los Diputados. El 11 de octubre de 2007, 16 días después, declaraba que la primera prioiridad para su departamento era la sustitución de estos vehículos por MRAP.

El 30 de septiembre de 2007 ya se enlazaba en este observatorio con este video. En él, el Senador Biden intentaba recabar apoyo para que la adquisición de MRAP para las FAS de su país fuese una prioridad nacional.

Este COUGAR recibió un impacto de un IED en Irak de más de 50 kilos de explosivo. De nuevo sin vítimas. La cámara de personal resultó intacta.

Un artículo publicado en el NYT en febrero de 2008 levanta ampollas en el Cuerpo de Marines de los EEUU. El artículo se basa en un informe realizado por un asesor civil de los Marines, Franz J. Gayl, en el que se acusa al Cuerpo de haber retrasado el despliegue de MRAP en Irak debido a la incompetencia de algunos mandos burocráticos intermedios que no dieron la importancia debida a las peticiones que el general Dennis J. Hejlik hizo con caracter urgente desde Irak.

Según el NYT, el asesor Gayl escribió:

“if the mass procurement and fielding of MRAPs had begun in 2005” in response to the known and acknowledged threats at that time “hundreds of deaths and injuries could have been prevented.”

[si se hubiese empezado con la adquisición y despliegue de los MRAPs en 2005, cientos de muertes y heridas no se hubiesen producido].

Unos días más tarde el Cuerpo de Marines de los EEUU solicita al Inspector General del Pentágono una investigación sobre la posible ralentización negligente del proceso de adquisición y despliegue de los MRAPs en Irak que podría haber costado la vida a cientos de marines según el informe del asesor tecnológico civil Franz J. Gayl. Gayl apunta responsabilidades hacia las oficinas de adquisición del Pentágono y del USMC.

El 18 de marzo de 2008 el Senador Kennedy en una carta dirigida al Comandante del Cuerpo de Marines de los EEUU le reprende por "tergiversar" la petición de vehículos blindados del USMC de febrero de 2005 al Congreso y por no colaborar en revisar el modo en que los Marines manejan las peticiones urgentes de nuevo equipamiento.

"Your mischaracterization of the request itself, coupled with your inaccurate testimony on the status of the Marine Corps order on the urgent needs request process, concerns me a great deal," Kennedy writes to the commandant.

"Su mala interpretación de la petición, doblada por su impreciso testimonio sobre el estatus de la orden del Cuerpo sobre el proceso de petición de necesidades urgentes, me preocupa sobremanera” escribió Kennedy la General.

Informe oficial de las FAS estadounidenses al Congreso ante el Congreso de los EEUU (marzo de 2008, página 23):

“Increasing the protection of Coalition forces is a top priority, and the fielding of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is one response to the threat. As of January 24, 2008, U.S. and Coalition forces have received 1,725 vehicles, representing 14% of authorized MRAPs and a 98% increase in little more than two months. The MRAP has demonstrated that it is much better than other wheeled vehicles in protecting troops from the effects of IEDs, and the newest of the MRAPs has sustained enormous explosions without any breach of the personnel compartment”.

"El aumento de la protección de las fuerzas de la coalición es una prioridad, y el envío de los MRAP es una respuesta a la amenaza. A partir del 24 de enero de 2008 EE.UU. y las fuerzas de la Coalición han recibido 1.725 vehículos, lo que representa el 14% de los MRAPs autorizados y un 98% de aumento en poco más de dos meses. El MRAP ha demostrado que es mucho mejor que otros vehículos de ruedas en la protección de las tropas de los efectos de la IED, y los más nuevos MRAPs han sufrido enormes explosiones sin ningún tipo de daño en el compartimento del personal”.

El 28 de abril de 2008 el General Jefe de nuestras fuezaras de UNIFIL en El Líbano informó personalmente a la ministra de que los BMR no aguantan más.

El 16 de mayo de 2008 el Secretario de Defensa de EEUU, Robert Gates, afirmaba que los MRAP son salvavidas bajo el título “Gates praises MRAPs as lifesavers”, y daba datos afirmando que los MRAPs son su primera prioridad:

“In about 150 attacks, 6% of U.S. troops have been injured or killed while in Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, including six deaths, Gates said. Humvees, the military's main vehicle, have had a 22% casualty rate. Even attacks on Abrams tanks are more than twice as likely to produce casualties than attacks on MRAPs, he said.”

"En cerca de 150 ataques sólo el 6% de las tropas de EE.UU. han resultado heridos o muertos cuando operaban en vehículos MRAP, incluyendo seis muertes, dijo Gates. En los Humvees, el vehículo militar principal, han tenido una tasa de bajas del 22%. Incluso en un ataque contra un tanque Abrams son más del doble las probabilidades de que se produzcan bajas que en un ataque a un MRAPs."

El 24 de junio de 2008 el portavoz de defensa del PSOE en el Congreso defendía los BMR en el Congreso .

El 03 de julio de 2008 diez mil MRAP habían sido entregados a las FAS estadounidenses desde que en mayo de 2007 el Secretario de Defensa Gates tomó la decisión de hacer de este asunto una prioridad. En un año y 2 meses, diez mil vehículos.

El 15 de julio de 2008 los jefes militares estadounidenses en Afganistán solicitaban que se les enviasen cientos de MRAP.

El 12 de noviembre de 2008 el PP presenta una enmienda para aumentar en 100 millones de euros la renovación de vehículos, su portavoz calificó a los BMR como "ataudes". La ministra de Defensa responde diciendo que los presupuestos asignados a su Departamento para 2009 contemplan la seguridad de las Fuerzas Armadas como "una prioridad máxima, superior y absoluta". "La hostilidad que marcan los tiempos no impedirá la seguridad de los militares sean prioridad máxima, superior y absoluta", indicó. A su vez Chacón mostró su agradecimiento a los grupos parlamentarios por las enmiendas introducidas a los presupuestos de Defensa y se mostró partidaria de "estudiar" la enmienda propuesta por el PP acerca de los blindados.

A día de hoy, después de más de un año desde la declaración de urgencia del Ministro Alonso por la que se hizo de esta sustitución una prioridad sólo 17 vehículos protegidos contra minas y emboscadas (MRAP) han sido entregados en la zona de operaciones de Afganistán. Ningún vehículo ha sido entregado en El Líbano.

Yo ya no sé explicarlo de otra manera. Con hechos contrastados, con informes oficiales y con opiniones de expertos. No hay ni una sola opinión personal en esta entrada. Cada cual que saque las conclusiones que quiera, o pueda.